**Pre-Commit -**

**Security activities before code** is checked in to version control

**Threat Modeling/Attack Mapping:** 

- Attacker personas
- **E**vil user stories
- Raindance Mozilla Rapid Risk Assessment
- OWASP ThreatDragon

**Security and Privacy Stories:** 

**OWASP ASVS** SAFECode Security Stories

- **IDE Security Plugins:**
- **DevSkim**
- **FindSecurityBugs**
- **Puma Scan** SonarLint

**Pre-Commit Security Hooks:** 

- git-hound
- git-secrets
- Repo-supervisor
- **■** ThoughtWorks Talisman

**Secure Coding Standards:** 

- **CERT Secure Coding Standards**
- **OWASP Proactive Controls**

**Manual and Peer Reviews:** 

- Gerrit
- **■** GitHub pull request
- **■** GitLab merge request
- **Review Board**

Fast, automated security checks during the build and **Continuous Integration steps** 

Dependency

**Management:** 

**Bundler-Audit** 

**■** Gemnasium

Retire.JS

Actuary

Anchore

Clair

Dagda

Falco

OWASP Dependency Check

**■ PHP Security Checker** 

Node Security Platform

**Container Security:** 

Static Code Analysis (SCA):

- **■** FindSecurityBugs
- Brakeman
- ESLint
- Phan

**Security Unit Tests:** 

- JUnit
- Mocha

xUnit Infrastructure as Code

- **Analysis:**
- ansible-lint
- Foodcritic
- cfn\_nag

puppet-lint

**Container Hardening:** 

Docker Bench

- Bane **CIS Benchmarks**
- grsecurity

Automated security acceptance, functional testing, and deep out-of-band scanning during Continuous Delivery

**Infrastructure as Code:** 

- Ansible
- Chef
- Puppet
- SaltStack Terraform
- Vagrant

Immutable Infrastructure:

- Docker rkt
- **Security Scanning:**
- Arachni
- nmap sqlmap
- sslyze ZAP

ssh\_scan

- AWS CloudFormation
- Azure Resource Manager
- Google Cloud Deployment Manager

**Security Acceptance Testing:** 

- **BDD-Security**
- Mittn

**Infrastructure Compliance** 

HubbleStack

**Cloud Configuration Management:** 

- Gauntlt
- **Infrastructure Tests:**
- Serverspec Test Kitchen

**Checks:** 

InSpec

**Cloud Secrets Management:** 

- AWS KMS Azure Key Vault

**Server Hardening:** 

dev-sec.io

**System (HIDS):** 

fail2ban

Samhain

OSSEC

SIMP

--> Production (Continuous Deployment) —

Security checks before, during, and after code is

deployed to production

Configuration Safety Checks:

**Security Smoke Tests:** 

**ZAP Baseline Scan** 

AWS Trusted Advisor

Security Monkey

Microsoft Azure Advisor

Secrets Management:

ssllabs-scan

**AWS Config** 

OSQuery

Ansible Vault

**Docker Secrets** 

Hashicorp Vault

**■ Pinterest Knox** 

Blackbox

Chef Vault

nmap

Google Cloud KMS

**Host Intrusion Detection** 

**Cloud Security Testing:** 

Game day exercises CloudSploit ■ Tabletop scenarios

- Nimbostratus
  - **Penetration Testing:** Attack-driven defense
    - Bug Bounties ■ Red team exercises

compliance checks

Fault Injection:

Chaos Kong

Chaos Monkey

**Cyber Simulations:** 

- **Threat Intelligence:** Diamond Model
- Kill Chain
- STIX TAXII
- **Continuous Scanning:**
- OpenSCAP
- OpenVAS
- Prowler Scout2

**Blameless Postmortems:** 

Etsy Morgue

**Continuous Monitoring:** 

- grafana graphite

Continuous security monitoring, testing, audit, and

- statsd

411

- seyren sof-elk
- ElastAlert

**Cloud Monitoring:** 

- CloudWatch
- CloudTrail
- Reddalert

**Cloud Compliance:** 

- Compliance Monkey
- Forseti Security

## Building a DevSecOps Program (CALMS)

Break down barriers between Development, Security, and Operations through education and outreach

Lean

Value stream analysis on security and compliance processes to

Share threats, risks, and vulnerabilities by adding them to engineering backlogs

## **Start Your DevOps Metrics Program**

- Number of high-severity vulnerabilities and how long they are open
- Scanning frequency and coverage

## **First Steps in Automation**

- Conduct negative unit testing to get off of the happy path Attack your system before somebody else does (e.g., Gauntlt)

Add hardening steps into configuration recipes (e.g., dev-sec.io)

Harden and test your CI/CD pipelines and do not rely on

Learn to build, deliver, and deploy modern applications using secure DevOps and cloud

**DEV540: Secure DevOps and** 

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DEV534 **Secure DevOps: A Practical Introduction** 

Secure DevOps and Cloud

**Application Security** 

DEV540

ASSESSMENT

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Jason Lam

Ben Allen

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## Culture

**Embed self-service automated security scanning and testing in** continuous delivery

## optimize flow

Use metrics to shape design and drive decisions

- Build and deployment cycle time Automated test frequency and coverage
- Number of attacks (and attackers) hitting your application

- Build a security smoke test (e.g., ZAP Baseline Scan)
- developer-friendly defaults

principles, practices, and tools.

**Cloud Application Security** 

**GSSP-NET** 

Secure Coding in Java/JEI GSSP-JAVA

**Security Essentials** 

AppSec CyberTalent **Assessment** 

Cloud Custodian

APPLICATION & SOFTWARE SECURITY

## SANS APPSEC CURRICULUM

SEC542 leb App Penetration Testing **Application Security** and Ethical Hacking **Awareness Modules** 

> **GWAPT** SEC642

> > **Advanced Web App Penetration Testing,** Ethical Hacking, and **Exploitation Techniques**

SPECIALIZATION



## SANSAppsec Securing W ogies (SWAT) CHECKLIST

The SWAT Checklist provides an easy-to-reference set of best practices that raise awareness and help development teams create more secure applications. It's a first step toward building a base of security knowledge around web application security. Use this checklist to identify the minimum standard that is required to

		es in your critical applications.	ireu to
E	RROR H	ANDLING AND LOGGIN	I G
	BEST PRACTICE	DESCRIPTION	CWE ID
	Display generic error messages	Error messages should not reveal details about the internal state of the application. For example, file system path and stack information should not be exposed to the user through error messages.	CWE-209
	No unhandled exceptions	Given the languages and frameworks in use for web application development, never allow an unhandled exception to occur. Error handlers should be configured to handle unexpected errors and gracefully return controlled output to the user.	CWE-391
	Suppress framework- generated errors	Your development framework or platform may generate default error messages. These should be suppressed or replaced with customized error messages, as framework-generated messages may reveal sensitive information to the user.	CWE-209
	Log all authentication and validation activities	Log any authentication and session management activities along with all input validation failures. Any security-related events should be logged. These may be used to detect past or in-progress attacks.	CWE-778
	Log all privilege changes	Any activities or occasions where the user's privilege level changes should be logged.	CWE-778
	Log administrative activities	Any administrative activities on the application or any of its components should be logged.	CWE-778
	Log access to sensitive data	Any access to sensitive data should be logged. This is particularly important for corporations that have to meet regulatory requirements like HIPAA, PCI, or SOX.	CWE-778
<b>\</b>	Do not log inappropriate data	While logging errors and auditing access are important, sensitive data should never be logged in an unencrypted form. For example, under HIPAA and PCI, it would be a violation to log sensitive data into the log itself unless the log is encrypted on the disk. Additionally, it can create a serious exposure point should the web application itself become compromised.	CWE-532
	Store logs securely	Logs should be stored and maintained appropriately to avoid information loss or tampering by intruders. Log retention should	CWE-533

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also follow the retention policy set forth by the organization to meet

regulatory requirements and provide enough information for forensic



and incident response activities.

# **Security Roadmap**

**Securing Web Application** Technologies (SWAT) CHECKLIST



**Secure DevOps Toolchain** 

Ingraining security into the mind of every developer.

software-security.sans.org

	D	ATA PROTECTION	
	USE HTTPS everywhere	Ideally, HTTPS should be used for your entire application. If you have to limit where it's used, then HTTPS must be applied to any authentication pages as well as to all pages after the user is authenticated. If sensitive information (e.g., personal information) can be submitted before authentication, those features must also be sent over HTTPS. Always link to the HTTPS version of URL if available. Relying on redirection from HTTP to HTTPS increases the opportunity for an attacker to insert a man-in-the-middle attack without raising the user's suspicion.  EXAMPLE: sslstrip	CWE 1D CWE-311 CWE-319 CWE-523
<b>/</b>	Disable HTTP access for all protected resources	For all pages requiring protection by HTTPS, the same URL should not be accessible via the insecure HTTP channel.	CWE-319
	Use the Strict- Transport- Security header	The Strict-Transport-Security header ensures that the browser does not talk to the server over HTTP. This helps reduce the risk of HTTP downgrade attacks as implemented by the sslsniff tool.	
	Store user passwords using a strong, iterative, salted hash	User passwords must be stored using secure hashing techniques with strong algorithms like PBKDF2, bcrypt, or SHA-512. Simply hashing the password a single time does not sufficiently protect the password. Use adaptive hashing (a work factor), combined with a randomly generated salt for each user to make the hash strong.  EXAMPLE: LinkedIn password leak	CWE-257
<b>/</b>	Securely exchange encryption keys	If encryption keys are exchanged or pre-set in your application, then any kestablishment or exchange must be performed over a secure channel.	ey
<b>/</b>	Set up secure key management processes	When keys are stored in your system they must be properly secured and only accessible to the appropriate staff on a need-to-know basis. <b>EXAMPLE:</b> AWS Key Management Service (KMS), Azure Key Vault, AWS CloudHSM	CWE-320
	Use strong TLS configurations	Weak ciphers must be disabled on all servers. For example, SSL v2, SSL v3, TLS protocols prior to 1.2 have known weaknesses and are not considered s Additionally, disable the NULL, RC4, DES, and MD5 cipher suites. Ensure all lengths are greater than 128 bits, use secure renegotiation, and disable con <b>EXAMPLE</b> : Qualys SSL Labs	ecure. key
	Use valid HTTPS certificates from a reputable certificate authority	HTTPS certificates should be signed by a reputable certificate authority. The name on the certificate should match the FQDN of the website. The certificate itself should be valid and not expired.  EXAMPLE: Let's Encrypt https://letsencrypt.org	
	Disable data caching using cache control headers and autocomplete	Browser data caching should be disabled using the cache control HTTP headers or meta tags within the HTML page. Additionally, sensitive input fields, such as the login form, should have the autocomplete attribute set to off in the HTML form to instruct the browser not to cache the credentials.	CWE-524
	Encrypt sensitive data at rest	Encrypt sensitive or critical data before storage.	CWE-311 CWE-312
	Limit the use and storage of sensitive data	Conduct an evaluation to ensure that sensitive data elements are not being unnecessarily transported or stored. Where possible, use tokenization to reduce data exposure risks.	
C	O N F I G U	RATION AND OPERATIO	N S
	Automate application deployment	Automating the deployment of your application, using Continuous Integration and Continuous Deployment, helps to ensure that changes are made in a consistent, repeatable manner in all environments.	CWEID
	Establish a rigorous change management process	A rigorous change management process must be maintained during operations. For example, new releases should only be deployed after proper testing and associated documentation has been completed.  EXAMPLE: DevOps Audit Defense Toolkit  https://itrevolution.com/devops-audit-defense-toolkit	CWE-439
	Define security requirements	Engage the business owner to define security requirements for the application includes items that range from the whitelist validation rules all the wanness of the login function. Determine the requirements up front ensures that security is baked into the system	ay to fining
	Conduct a design review	Integrating security into the design phase saves money and time. Conduct a risk review with security professionals and threat model the application to identify key risks. This helps you integrate appropriate countermeasures into the design and architecture of the application.	CWE-701 CWE-656
	Perform code reviews	Security-focused code reviews can be one of the most effective ways to find security bugs. Regularly review your code looking for common issues like SQL Injection and Cross-Site Scripting. Leverage automated tools to maximize breadth of coverage and consistency.	CWE-702
<b>/</b>	Perform security testing	Conduct security testing both during and after development to ensure the application meets security standards. Testing should also be conducted af releases to ensure vulnerabilities did not get introduced during the update Leverage automation by including security tests into the CI/CD pipeline.	ter major
<b>/</b>	Harden the infrastructure	All components of infrastructure that support the application should be configured according to security best practices and hardening guidelines. In a typical web application this can include routers, firewalls, network switches, operating systems, web servers, application servers, databases, and application frameworks.	CWE-15 CWE-656
<b>/</b>	Define an incident handling plan	An incident handling plan should be drafted and tested on a regular basis. The contact list of people to involve in a security incident related to the application should be well defined and kept up to date.	

	AUTHENTICATION
BEST PRACTICE	DESCRIPTION CWE ID
Don't hardcode credentials	Never allow credentials to be stored directly within the application code. CWE-798 While it can be convenient to test application code with hardcoded credentials during development, this significantly increases risk and should be avoided.  EXAMPLE: Hard-coded passwords in networking devices https://www.us-cert.gov/control_systems/pdf/ICSA-12-243-01.pdf
Develop a strong password reset system	Password reset systems are often the weakest link in an application.  These systems are often based on users answering personal questions to establish their identity and in turn reset the password. The system needs to be based on questions that are both hard to guess and brute force.  Additionally, any password reset option must not reveal whether or not an account is valid, preventing username harvesting.  EXAMPLE: Sara Palin password hack http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarah_Palin_email_hack
Implement a strong password policy	A password policy should be created and implemented so that passwords CWE-521 meet specific strength criteria.  EXAMPLE: https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63-3.html
Implement account lockout against brute-force attacks	Account lockout needs to be implemented to prevent brute-force attacks against both the authentication and password reset functionality.  After several tries on a specific user account, the account should be locked for a period of time or until it is manually unlocked. Additionally, it is best to continue the same failure message indicating that the credentials are incorrect or the account is locked to prevent an attacker from harvesting usernames.
Don't disclose too much information in error messages	Messages for authentication errors must be clear and, at the same time, be written so that sensitive information about the system is not disclosed. For example, error messages that reveal that the user id is valid but that the corresponsing password is incorrect confirm to an attacker that the account does exist on the system.
Store database credentials securely	Modern web applications usually consist of multiple layers. The business CWE-257 logic tier (processing of information) often connects to the data tier (database). Connecting to the database, of course, requires authentication. The authentication credentials in the business logic tier must be stored in a centralized location that is locked down. Scattering credentials throughout the source code is not acceptable. Some development frameworks provide a centralized secure location for storing credentials to the backend database. These encrypted stores should be leveraged when possible.
Applications and middleware should run with minimal privileges	If an application becomes compromised it is important that the application itself and any middleware services be configured to run with minimal privileges. For instance, while the application layer or business layer need the ability to read and write data to the underlying database, administrative credentials that grant access to other databases or tables should not be provided.
S F S	S S I O N M A N A G E M E N T
BEST PRACTICE	
BEST PRACTICE	DESCRIPTION CWE ID
Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must CWE-6
Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must CWE-6
Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must be of sufficient length to withstand analysis and prediction.  Session tokens should be regenerated when the user authenticates to the application and when the user privilege level changes. Additionally, should the encryption status change, the session token should always be regenerated.
Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random  Regenerate session tokens  Implement an idle	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must be of sufficient length to withstand analysis and prediction.  Session tokens should be regenerated when the user authenticates to the application and when the user privilege level changes. Additionally, should the encryption status change, the session token should always be regenerated.  When a user is not active, the application should automatically log the user out. Be aware that Ajax applications may make recurring calls to
Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random  Regenerate session tokens  Implement an idle session timeout  Implement an absolute session	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must be of sufficient length to withstand analysis and prediction.  Session tokens should be regenerated when the user authenticates to the application and when the user privilege level changes. Additionally, should the encryption status change, the session token should always be regenerated.  When a user is not active, the application should automatically log the user out. Be aware that Ajax applications may make recurring calls to the application, effectively resetting the timeout counter automatically.  Users should be logged out after an extensive amount of time (e.g., 4-8 hours) has passed since they logged in. This helps
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Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random  Regenerate session tokens  Implement an idle session timeout  Destroy sessions at any sign of tampering  Invalidate the session after	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must be of sufficient length to withstand analysis and prediction.  Session tokens should be regenerated when the user authenticates to the application and when the user privilege level changes. Additionally, should the encryption status change, the session token should always be regenerated.  When a user is not active, the application should automatically log the user out. Be aware that Ajax applications may make recurring calls to the application, effectively resetting the timeout counter automatically.  Users should be logged out after an extensive amount of time (e.g., 4-8 hours) has passed since they logged in. This helps mitigate the risk of an attacker using a hijacked session.  Unless the application requires multiple simultaneous sessions for a single user, implement features to detect session cloning attempts. Should any sign of session cloning be detected, the session should be destroyed, forcing the real user to reauthenticate.  When the user logs out of the application, the session and corresponding data on the server must be destroyed. This ensures that
Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random  Regenerate session tokens  Implement an idle session timeout  Implement an absolute session timeout  Destroy sessions at any sign of tampering  Invalidate the session after logout  Place a logout button on every	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must be of sufficient length to withstand analysis and prediction.  Session tokens should be regenerated when the user authenticates to the application and when the user privilege level changes. Additionally, should the encryption status change, the session token should always be regenerated.  When a user is not active, the application should automatically log the user out. Be aware that Ajax applications may make recurring calls to the application, effectively resetting the timeout counter automatically.  Users should be logged out after an extensive amount of time (e.g., 4-8 hours) has passed since they logged in. This helps mitigate the risk of an attacker using a hijacked session.  Unless the application requires multiple simultaneous sessions for a single user, implement features to detect session cloning attempts. Should any sign of session cloning be detected, the session should be destroyed, forcing the real user to reauthenticate.  When the user logs out of the application, the session and corresponding data on the server must be destroyed. This ensures that the session cannot be accidentially revived.  The logout button or logout link should be easily accessible to users on
Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random  Regenerate session tokens  Implement an idle session timeout  Implement an absolute session timeout  Destroy sessions at any sign of tampering  Invalidate the session after logout  Place a logout button on every page  Use secure cookie attributes (i.e., HttpOnly and	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must be of sufficient length to withstand analysis and prediction.  Session tokens should be regenerated when the user authenticates to the application and when the user privilege level changes. Additionally, should the encryption status change, the session token should always be regenerated.  When a user is not active, the application should automatically log the user out. Be aware that Ajax applications may make recurring calls to the application, effectively resetting the timeout counter automatically.  Users should be logged out after an extensive amount of time (e.g., 4-8 hours) has passed since they logged in. This helps mitigate the risk of an attacker using a hijacked session.  Unless the application requires multiple simultaneous sessions for a single user, implement features to detect session cloning attempts. Should any sign of session cloning be detected, the session should be destroyed, forcing the real user to reauthenticate.  When the user logs out of the application, the session and corresponding data on the server must be destroyed. This ensures that the session cannot be accidentially revived.  The logout button or logout link should be easily accessible to users on every page after they have authenticated.  CWE-613  CWE-613  CWE-613  CWE-614
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Ensure that session identifiers are sufficiently random  Regenerate session tokens  Implement an idle session timeout  Implement an absolute session timeout  Destroy sessions at any sign of tampering  Invalidate the session after logout  Place a logout button on every page  Use secure cookie attributes (i.e., HttpOnly and Secure flags)  Set the cookie domain and path correctly  Set the cookie expiration time	Session tokens must be generated by secure random functions and must be of sufficient length to withstand analysis and prediction.  Session tokens should be regenerated when the user authenticates to the application and when the user privilege level changes. Additionally, should the encryption status change, the session token should always be regenerated.  When a user is not active, the application should automatically log the user out. Be aware that Ajax applications may make recurring calls to the application, effectively resetting the timeout counter automatically.  Users should be logged out after an extensive amount of time (e.g., 4-8 hours) has passed since they logged in. This helps mitigate the risk of an attacker using a hijacked session.  Unless the application requires multiple simultaneous sessions for a single user, implement features to detect session cloning attempts. Should any sign of session cloning be detected, the session should be destroyed, forcing the real user to reauthenticate.  When the user logs out of the application, the session and corresponding data on the server must be destroyed. This ensures that the session cannot be accidentially revived.  The logout button or logout link should be easily accessible to users on every page after they have authenticated.  The session cookie should be set with both the HttpOnly and the Secure flags. This ensures that the session id will not be accessible to client-side scripts and will only be transmitted over HTTPS.  The cookie domain and path scope should be set to the most restrictive settings for your application. Any wildcard domain scoped cookie must have a good justification for its existence.  The session cookie should have a reasonable expiration time.  Non-expiring session cookies should be avoided.



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